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Abstract 
Drawing upon ideas formulated with national level campaigning in mind and also analyses of 
district or local-level campaigning, a conceptual framework to assist in analysing the development 
of district-level campaigning is presented. The proposed framework is further amplified, 
explained and tested using quantitative and qualitative data collected at British general elections 
between 1992 and 2005. Various aspects of district (constituency) campaigning in Britain are 
examined and the extent of change over four general elections analysed.  In broad terms, the data 
show a good fit with the framework which offers a useful way of thinking about developments in 
campaigning both within and across countries.  
 
Introduction 
For most political parties election campaigning is a core activity.  Apart from a few on the 
fringes of politics, all parties contest elections and seek to win support among the electorate.  
For as long as there have been competitive elections, indeed, there has been election 
campaigning.  Parties devote enormous resources to the activity, national campaigns attract 
intense media interest and many thousands of party activists (still) get involved at local level. 
Not surprisingly, this key area of party activity has attracted considerable attention from 
scholars.  For the most part they have focused on national-level campaigning but in recent 
years there has been a resurgence of interest in ‘on-the-ground’ campaigning at the level of 
the electoral district – both in Britain and elsewhere.  This literature has thrown light on a 
number of important questions including how campaigning has changed, in style and in 
activities undertaken, in response to changes among the electorate and to technological 
developments. In addition, studies have explored differences between parties in the extent to 
which they are able to harness their campaign resources effectively.  Such differences often 
reflect cultural and institutional features of parties.  The respective roles assigned to the 
central bureaucracy and grass-roots activists in the management of campaigns is an aspect of 
campaign organisation that has implications for perennial questions relating to the 
distribution of power within parties.  Academic interest in election campaigning has been 
sustained by the emergence of a burgeoning literature on political communications and 
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political marketing in which a particular area of interest has been the extent to which parties 
are increasingly using campaign techniques derived from the commercial world.   
 
 
Attempts have been made to provide a comparative framework for understanding the 
development of campaigning at national level but there has been little comparable work on 
district-level campaigning, despite the emerging evidence that in a number of countries such 
campaigning can significantly affect election outcomes. This article represents an attempt to 
address this lacuna. In the first section we discuss two models of change in national 
campaigning before going on to draw some lessons from comparative studies of local 
campaigning. 
 
The Development of National Campaigning 
In her comparative analysis of campaigning, Pippa Norris (2002) suggests that campaigns 
have developed through three phases: Pre-modern (characterising the period from the mid-
nineteenth century to the 1950s), Modern (from the early 1960s to the late 1980s), and Post-
modern (from the 1990s onwards). Pre-modern campaigning was pre-eminently local and 
focused on direct contact between candidates and citizens.  Campaigns were locally 
organised, locally staffed and based on traditional labour-intensive methods.  Such national 
campaigning as existed was co-ordinated by party leaders and was characterised by short-
term, ad hoc planning.  Modern campaigns involved greater co-ordination by central party 
officials. The national campaign was clearly paramount (reflecting the growth of television) 
and party campaign activity became more professionalised. Finally, the Post-Modern 
campaign involves continuous campaigning – it is no longer confined to the few months 
before an election - and much use of professional consultants. Media management is a key 
(perhaps the key) activity at national level and although more emphasis is given to local 
campaigning (involving new techniques) local activity becomes more tightly managed and 
co-ordinated by the centre.  
 
A categorisation of this kind is inevitably somewhat simplified.  It seems far-fetched, for 
example, to claim that nineteenth century campaigns belong in the same (‘pre-modern’) 
category as those in the 1950s.  Arguably, national campaigning began to emerge at the end 
of the nineteenth century, developed between the wars and was already well-established by 
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the 1950s (see Denver and Hands, 1997: 3-18).  Nonetheless, Norris’s typology is interesting 
and suggestive. 
 
Farrell and Webb (2002) have also developed a useful three-stage comparative model of 
campaign professionalisation which echoes some of the work of Norris. They argue that the 
development of campaigning is a function of technical, resource and thematic changes. 
Technical developments refer principally to the growth of television and, more recently, new 
communication technologies which include the use of direct communication with voters and 
the internet. Such developments are accompanied by increased attention to campaign 
preparation. Resource developments refer to the growing strength and influence within the 
party of the central bureaucracy, the professionalisation of party staff, the use of outside 
professional advisors and of an increasing range of feedback mechanisms such as polls and 
focus groups. Finally, thematic changes refer to the process of ‘presidentialisation’, the 
argument being that, making use of new forms of communication, campaigns have focussed 
increasingly on party leaders,. According to Farrell and Webb (2002: 122) this reflects a shift 
from ‘selling to marketing’, which manifests itself in increasingly sophisticated targeting of 
key voters and a move away from party ‘propaganda’ towards campaign communications 
conceived of as  marketing tools.  
 
Although Norris‘s approach refers to the balance between national and local campaigning, 
her focus is primarily on the national campaign and the same is true of Farrell and Webb. 
Neither provides (or is concerned to provide) a comprehensive typology for the study of 
district-level campaigning alone.  There are some areas of obvious overlap between national 
and district campaigns – indeed, we have suggested elsewhere that the two are becoming 
increasingly integrated – but a number of aspects of national campaigning, such as television 
and media management, for example, are relevant only at that level. 
 
District-level Campaigning 
Focussing explicitly on constituency (district) level campaigning, Denver and Hands (2002) 
have suggested a framework which they described as Fordist and Post-Fordist forms of 
campaigning. Fordism refers to ‘mass production’ in district campaigns – essentially 
individual district campaigns are undifferentiated, require few specialized skills and are 
mainly concerned with the mobilisation of supporters. Post-Fordism involves flexible 
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specialization and niche marketing. Thus, campaigns and campaign techniques are adjusted 
to meet voter demands, and this requires more flexible and more skilled campaign managers. 
 
Denver and Hands note that the application of the Fordist/Post-Fordist distinction to district 
campaigning is exploratory only and concede that it meets with mixed success.  While many 
of the new campaign techniques have Post-Fordist connotations, the same cannot be said of 
developments in the organisation and management of campaigns.  A fuller categorisation is 
required, therefore, that captures more of the dimensions of campaign change. 
 
The need for an alternative framework is further highlighted by comparative work, which 
suggests that developments in district-level campaigning vary across different countries.  In 
Canada, for example, Carty et al. (2003) posit a two-stage process that explains how 
campaigns vary in terms of style, funding and local autonomy.  The competitiveness of the 
electoral district, the nature of the nomination process and the structure of the party combine 
to produce four main candidate types.  Each of these types in turn is associated with a 
distinctive pattern of campaign organisation and practice. Variations in the extent of local 
autonomy indicate that campaigns have evolved from being purely local affairs and now 
involve the central or regional party to a greater or lesser degree. 
 
In New Zealand, Denemark (2003) argues that moves towards Norris’ Modern phase were 
delayed. Indeed, it was not until the late 1970s that television began to play a key role in 
campaigns. Until the late 1980s local campaigns were ‘low profile, non-professional, 
nationally focussed, and susceptible to local MP demands for attention, irrespective of the 
seat’s overall strategic importance’ (p. 603). In reaction to poor election results, however, the 
major parties began to rethink campaigning and the change to the electoral system in 1996 
accelerated the process of change.  As a consequence, district campaigning was modernised 
in much the same way as in other countries.  Ward’s (2003) study of campaigning in 
Australia suggests a similar pattern of change. From the 1980s, there was a big shift in 
Australian district campaigning with an increasing emphasis on tactical seats and key voters 
within them. In Ireland, however, the Norris model fits poorly.  According to Marsh (2004) 
local campaigning in Ireland remains very much a matter of personal contact between 
candidates and voters – ‘meeting the folks’ (p. 263).  Irish district campaigns are essentially 
pre-modern.  In the 2002 Irish elections, for example, some 55% of voters recalled being 
visited by at least one candidate – in both absolute and comparative terms, a very high figure 
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(pp. 249-50). In addition, everyone involved – candidates, party professionals, commentators 
– believes that personalised campaigning is effective (and this is supported by statistical 
analysis) so that that Irish campaigning is likely to remain pre-modern for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
A Framework for Analysing Change in District Campaigning 
Overall, then, previous work on district campaigning suggests that it would be useful to 
develop a framework that moves beyond simplified notions of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
styles of campaigning and identifies different stages of development as well as core themes. 
In particular, it would allow us to evaluate the extent to which parties’ campaign styles 
develop and enable us to compare campaigning by different parties, as well as campaigns in 
different countries. We seek to introduce such a framework here and then test it using 
available data from detailed studies of campaigns at the last four general elections in Britain 
(1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005). 
 
The intention is that the framework can be used for comparative purposes.  It is apparent, 
however, that differing institutional contexts such as the electoral system, campaign 
regulations, the party system and so on will have a significant impact on some of its aspects 
(see Norris, 2002).  For example, the targeting of marginal constituencies is likely to be a 
much more significant activity in plurality and majoritarian electoral systems than in (at least 
some) PR systems. The structure of the party system will also be important: in multi-party 
systems there are likely to be greater variations in campaigning than in two- or three-party 
systems. Finally, variations in electoral regulation will have a mediating impact on 
campaigning. Where campaign expenditure limits exist, for example, those set at a lower 
level are likely to promote more labour-intensive volunteer-led forms of campaigning. An 
example of institutional mediation leading to campaign variation can be found in Farrell and 
Scully’s study of MEPs (2007).  They show that voter canvassing using either personal 
contact or by telephone, is more prevalent in candidate-focussed systems like STV and in 
Britain, where despite the introduction of List PR for European Elections, a culture of more 
traditional campaigning evidently endures (Farrell & Scully, 2007: 130-7). 
 
Norris’s ‘dominant era’ model is not entirely suitable as a framework – it is mainly concerned 
with national campaigning and does not fit particularly well in some countries. Our typology 
is derived, therefore, from Farrell and Webb’s model of campaign professionalism which 
 6 
allows for more nuanced and accurate indicators of campaign change but is adapted here to 
refer specifically to district-level campaigning.  The framework is summarised in Figure 1. 
We propose a three-stage model, each stage being differentiated by Technical, Resource and 
Thematic developments.  Technical matters refer principally to two things. First, the extent to 
which district campaigns involve long-term preparation both in the district and at party 
headquarters. Second, the extent to which parties utilize technology as a campaign tool and 
the balance between the use of technology and more traditional campaign techniques. 
Resource changes focus on three aspects of campaigning. Firstly, there is the degree of 
central party control and influence over district campaigns and, secondly, the degree to which 
the staffing of local campaigns has moved from a voluntary basis towards becoming more 
professionalised. Thirdly, this aspect also includes feedback techniques – how district-level 
(and national) parties monitor levels of support within the various electoral districts. Finally, 
the thematic category relates to two aspects of campaigning - the involvement of leading 
politicians in district campaigns (mainly through personal visits) and the extent to which local 
campaigns have evolved from being primarily concerned to mobilise specific social 
categories of electors towards the kind of marketing that Farrell and Webb describe, which 
involves targeting specific individual  voters. 
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
 
In what follows we illustrate the use of this framework in the British context, largely on the 
basis of surveys of election agents (who are responsible for running local campaigns) at each 
of the four general elections from 1992 to 2005, but also using qualitative information 
collected from party officials over the same four elections.  The surveys were conducted 
immediately after each general election and the population covered included all agents of the 
three main parties in Britain (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) which are the 
objects of our attention here. With one exception, there were representative responses for all 
parties in each election (response rates are detailed in the Appendix). The exception is the 
case of the Conservatives in 2005 so that results based on these responses should be treated 
with caution
1
. Where appropriate, we have drawn attention to this in the text. Finally, while 
                                                 
1  The response from Conservative agents in the 2005 survey was disappointing, particular since 
responses from them in previous studies had been on a par with other parties. The likely reason for the 
lower response rate was poor address data provided for Conservative agents. Nonetheless, whilst the 
response rate is low for this group in this election, the data generated are nevertheless indicative and 
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districts is the appropriate comparative term for the electoral units under consideration here, 
we generally use constituencies in what follows as that is the name for the relevant British 
electoral districts. 
 
Applying the Comparative Framework to the British Case 
 
 
Technical Changes 
Campaign Preparation 
In previous work (Denver et al., 2003), we have shown on the basis of qualitative data how 
the parties at national level have increasingly planned and prepared their constituency 
campaigns in advance. In preparation for the 1992 election, for example, Labour set up a key 
seats unit some two years before polling day and such advance planning and organisation is 
now routine in all parties.  We consider here, however, whether there is evidence of a move 
towards longer-term campaign preparation in the constituencies themselves. Our surveys of 
election agents contained a number of questions relating to campaign preparations and in 
order to get an overall picture, we have created two indices of long-term preparation. The 
first covers elections from 1992 to 2005 and the second those from 1997 onwards since 
additional questions were asked in later surveys.  The variables used to construct the indices 
are shown in the Appendix. The datasets relating to each individual election were pooled and 
relevant variables entered into Principal Components Analyses. In each case, these produced 
single components with associated factor scores and we take these factor scores as overall 
measures of the extent of long-term preparation at local level.  As in previous analyses (see, 
for example Denver and Hands 1997; Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a), the factor scores 
have been standardized around a mean of 100 to allow for ease of interpretation, both 
between parties and over time.  
 
Table 1 shows the mean scores on the long-term constituency preparation indices for each 
party in each election. For this and subsequent tables, where appropriate, we have used 
                                                                                                                                                        
therefore useful. We take this view for the following reasons. First, we have indicated in each case, 
where the Conservative figure for 2005 should be treated with some caution. Secondly, whilst the 
response rate is lower than usual, it is not insignificant. Thirdly, where the data have been included in 
the calculation of more general indexes, they do not have the effect of making these indexes inaccurate 
– after checking, we find any effect to be marginal or non-existent. For these reasons, we are confident 
that the inclusion of the 2005 data for the Conservatives is justified, not least since to exclude the data 
would also mean the non-inclusion of the robust data from other parties. Moreover, our view is that 
weighting the data would introduce inaccuracies which would be more serious than any potential 
shortcomings with the existing data for 2005. 
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analysis of variance (an F test) to test for the significance of differences between means. On 
the face of it, there are few clear trends. Only the Conservatives appear to demonstrate the 
anticipated pattern, increasing their mean level of campaign preparation at each election from 
1997 onwards according to both indices.  In both cases the 2005 figure is significantly 
different from the others, Labour campaigns, in contrast, appear to have engaged in 
progressively less long-term preparation since 1997 and  indeed, using either index, the figure 
for 1997 is significantly larger than those for 2001 and 2005. There is no apparent trend for 
Liberal Democrat campaigns, although the figure for 1992 is significantly larger than the 
others and the dip in 2001 is significant when compared with 1997 and 2005 (on the basis of 
the second index). 
 
When we disaggregate the scores for major parties according to the target status of 
constituencies, however, some important patterns emerge (Table 2). In this and subsequent 
tables, there are three categories of seat: Target Seats (which may include both seats being 
defended and seats held by another party); seats held by the party but not targeted (Held Not 
Target); and seats neither held by the party nor targeted (Not Held Not Target). As Denver 
and Hands (2002:111-2) point out, parties have always had target seats, but in practical terms 
this often meant little. In the 1990s, however, targeting became progressively more rigorous 
and far-reaching – a trend also apparent in other democracies (see, for example, Ward, 2003) 
– though not in all (see Carty et al., 2003). Under the simple plurality electoral system it is 
rational for parties to try, as far as possible, to concentrate campaign resources on target seats 
– those that they may gain or are in danger of losing - although there will inevitably be 
constraints on their ability to do this.  For one thing, party membership may well be larger in 
seats where they have already been electorally successful (see Fisher, 2000; Fisher, Denver 
and Hands, 2006b).  This means that not only members but the general resources that arise 
from larger memberships are likely to be in greater supply in seats that parties already hold.  
 
Table 2 shows, first, that in almost all cases the extent of long-term planning is greater in 
target seats than in others.  This is most pronounced for Labour whose target seats are 
significantly different in statistical terms from the other categories in all four elections. For 
the Liberal Democrats, given their small number of safe seats, the significant difference is 
likely to be between non-held non-target and other seats, and indeed, this is the case in 2001 
and 2005. For the Conservatives, however, the only statistically significant differences are 
between non-held non-target seats and other seats in 1992, 1997 and 2001. Secondly, for all 
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three parties long-term planning has declined in seats that were poor electoral prospects.
2
 The 
Conservatives have increased their level of long-term preparation election-on-election in 
target seats. This is as would be expected given the growing concentration on targets but long 
term-planning also appears to have increased in safe seats (held not targeted). This reflects a 
persistent problem for Conservative campaign managers in that their campaigns are often 
strongest in their safest seats, or at least nearly as strong as in their targets (Denver et al., 
2003). Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference between targets and seats already 
held. There was little change in the extent of long-term planning in Liberal Democrat targets 
between 1997 and 2001 but a clear increase in 2005.  There was also an increase in the seats 
held but not targeted.  This is because almost all the Liberal Democrat held seats were 
originally won through targeted intensive campaigning and, even although some have 
become relatively safe, campaigns in them continue to be relatively strong.  For Labour the 
results over time are more mixed.  As already noted, long-term preparations are most 
extensive in target seats but one measure there was a decline in the level of advance 
preparations in targets in 2001 and again in 2005.  On the second measure the dip in 2001 
was reversed to an extent in 2005.  The lower figures for both elections are probably 
explained by a decline in the number of party members involved in Labour campaigns (see 
Table 3).  
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
 
Overall, the evidence relating to the development of long-term campaign preparation is 
somewhat mixed.  There seems to be no trend in the overall scores but for all parties there is a 
fairly clear and generally increasing differentiation between different types of seats. By and 
large, ‘hopeless’ seats are falling behind in their levels of preparation compared with safe and 
target seats and, generally speaking, target seats are more prepared than safe ones. Thus, 
using this measure together with qualitative accounts of party preparations (see, for example, 
Denver et al., 2003, Fisher et al., 2007), we can say that in terms of long-term preparation the 
major parties have certainly moved to stage 2 in our analytical framework.  
 
                                                 
2  The Conservative 2005 figure is particularly unreliable here, being based on only six cases. 
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Traditional and Modern Campaign Techniques 
Party members are the bedrock of traditional constituency campaigning. They provide labour 
for a variety of tasks: doorstep canvassing, delivering leaflets, taking numbers at polling 
stations, ‘knocking-up’ voters on polling day and so on. Without party members it would be 
almost impossible to run a traditional constituency campaign focused on identifying 
supporters and mobilising them on polling day. Indeed, while Fisher, Denver and Hands 
(2006a) argue that simply having a large number of members is no guarantee of an effective 
campaign (compare Whiteley and Seyd, 2003), they concede, nonetheless, that a campaign 
involving relatively few members is likely to be less successful than one which can call upon 
a large volunteer work force.  
 
During the period 1992-2005, however, there were significant changes in the average 
membership of constituency parties (Table 3). Compared with 1992 the membership of the 
two largest parties (Conservative and Labour) has declined significantly. For the 
Conservatives the picture has been one of almost continuous decline (the 2005 figures, for 
reasons previously explained, are possibly less robust). Labour membership increased in 
1997 but has been declining since then, with the mean membership per constituency in 2005 
being nearly 100 smaller than it was in 1992. Liberal Democrat membership also declined 
after 1992 but rallied somewhat in 2005.  
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
Whatever the reasons for this decline in party membership, which is not unique to the United 
Kingdom (see Scarrow, 2002: 86-94), it is clear that British parties will have found it 
increasingly difficult to mount strong traditional campaigns from the 1990s. A second 
contextual point, which should be made in relation to changes in campaigning during this 
period is that there has been a rapid growth in the availability of (and decline in the cost of) 
technology such as computers, which can be used in election campaigning to reduce 
dependence on volunteer workers. The 1992 general election was dubbed ‘the fax election’ 
by Denver and Hands (1997) but by 2005 the fax had become all but obsolete and the use of 
personal computers in campaigning had become widespread.  
 
So, the pool of labour available to work in traditional campaigns has by and large declined 
while a range of technologies that can be used to assist campaigns has become much more 
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freely available. As comparative evidence shows, faced with a decline in membership parties 
often have little choice but to turn to more modern campaign tools in order, in part, to meet 
the shortfall of campaign workers (Ward, 2003; Denemark, 2003).  To what extent, then, 
have campaigning techniques changed? 
 
In previous work (Denver et al., 2003), we have described in general terms how parties have 
modernised their campaigns. Ward (2003) and Denemark (2003) have illustrated similar 
patterns in Australia and New Zealand respectively. We analyse these changes in more detail 
here by using indices which measure the extent of traditionalism and modernisation in local 
campaigns. The indices are based the variables shown in the Appendix and were calculated in 
the same way as those used to measure long-term campaigning. The traditionalism index 
includes measures of poster and leaflet distribution, doorstep canvassing, public meetings and 
what might be called ‘manual’ polling day activity – such as number taking and knocking up.  
As far as modernisation is concerned, not all the relevant questions were asked at each 
election (indeed, changing questions themselves reflect the modernisation of campaigns) and 
so we have calculated two indices. The first (Modernisation A) includes variables available in 
all four surveys; the second (Modernisation B) covers the elections of 1997, 2001 and 2005 
and includes variables relating to the use of direct mail, telephone ‘knocking-up’ and a more 
accurate measure of the extent of telephone canvassing.
 
 
 
Table 4 describes the trends in traditional campaigning, as measured by mean scores on the 
relevant index. Overall, it shows that, despite a slight revival in 2005, traditional campaigning 
has tended to decline and the overall means for each year are statistically significantly 
different from one another.  There are some variations by party, however. In the case of 
Labour in successive elections after 1992 there was less strong traditional campaigning and 
this decline is statistically significant.  Traditional campaigning by the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats also declined (significantly) until 2001. In 2005, however, the decline was 
reversed in both parties and scores on the traditionalism index were not significantly different 
from the 1992 scores. In the case of the Conservatives, this apparent reversal should be 
treated with some caution given the relatively small number of cases involved. In the case of 
the Liberal Democrats, however, there are no such concerns.  The most likely explanation for 
any upswing in traditional campaigning by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrat in 2005 
is the electoral context. All elections are not alike, and the context is likely to affect levels of 
activity (see for example, Denver et al., 2002). The 2005 contest was perceived as being far 
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tighter than that of 2001, and in addition, it was thought that the Liberal Democrats had a real 
opportunity to make a significant electoral advance. Thus, just as Liberal Democrat 
membership grew, so traditional activities undertaken by members, also increased. The 
Conservatives too had some cause for optimism – certainly much more than in the previous 
two elections. So while the Conservative figure may be an exaggeration, the likelihood is that 
there was indeed an increase in traditional activity by these two parties.  A large membership 
does not equate fully with intense activity (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a) but the 
evidence presented here suggests that the intensity of volunteer activity in campaigns is fairly 
closely linked with the level of membership. 
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
In Table 5, we show trends in campaign modernisation on the basis of the two indices 
described above and the overall trends are clear enough. Whichever index is used there is an 
election-on-election increase in the modernisation of campaigns. In both cases the overall 
scores for each election are significantly different from one another. There is also a steady 
increase for each of the parties and in each case the differences between the earlier and later 
elections are statistically significant. What is also noteworthy is that the increase in Labour 
modernisation was far slower after 1997 than it was for the other parties. Labour appears to 
have made great strides after 1992, but has effectively consolidated its position thereafter. 
Notwithstanding our concerns about the Conservative data for 2005, it appears that increases 
in Conservative and Liberal Democrat modernisation have been steadier, with the Liberal 
Democrats rapidly ‘catching-up’ with  the two big parties. 
 
[Table 5 About Here] 
 
By and large then, traditional campaigning has been declining, whilst modernisation has been 
increasing. We can establish the relative balance between traditionalism and modernisation 
by subtracting the index of modernisation from the index of traditionalism to produce a ‘net’ 
score. Since both are measured on the same scale (having been standardised around a mean of 
100), the results are easy to interpret. Positive net scores suggest more traditionalism relative 
to modernisation while negative scores suggest the reverse and the distance of net scores 
from zero allows us to establish any trends in this balance. Table 6 shows the mean net scores 
for each party as well as the overall score at each election and the trends are again relatively 
clear – each election sees the balance of campaigning tilting more towards modernisation, 
 13 
with 2001 being the ‘tipping point’. With only one exception, all scores are positive until 
1997 and all are negative thereafter. For the first modernisation index the 2001 and 2005 
overall scores are significantly different from those for 1992 and 1997; for the second, all 
three scores are significantly different from one another. The net scores for the individual 
parties suggest a trend towards modernisation and in almost all cases the scores for the later 
elections are significantly different from those for the earlier elections, in the expected 
direction. 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
 
 
In Table 7 we show the net modernisation scores for each of the three main parties according 
to the electoral status of constituencies.   It is clear, first, that the balance between traditional 
and modern techniques has shifted towards the latter in all types of seat.  By 2005, it was only 
Conservative campaigns in their safe seats, which were significantly more traditional than the 
other categories from 1992, that traditional activities were given more weight than modern 
methods.  Secondly, for both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats it is in seats that 
were neither held nor targeted that the balance is most firmly in the direction of modern 
campaigning. Although in both cases scores in these hopeless seats are rarely significantly 
different from those in target seats, this itself is evidence that modern techniques – the use of 
telephones and the like – can be a sort of substitute for volunteer personnel.  Where there 
simply aren’t enough volunteers to canvass door-to-door or deliver leaflets then a few 
telephone canvassers can fill the gap.  On the other hand, modern methods may be seen to be 
simply more effective and in that case we should expect to see them introduced more quickly 
into target seats.  This is the pattern found in Labour campaigning – from 1997 campaigns in 
target seats are weighted more strongly in the direction of modern techniques than is the case 
in the other categories, a pattern confirmed by significance tests using the 1997-2005 index.  
 
[Table 7 About Here] 
 
Our data clearly show, then, that the use of traditional campaign techniques has been 
declining while modern methods have become more prevalent. Data not presented here show 
that for all parties the use of modern techniques is always most developed in target seats.  
However, these seats also have strong traditional campaigns – volunteer workers often flood 
into them from the surrounding area – so that it is only in the case of the Labour party that 
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targets show the strongest bias in favour of modernisation.  For the other parties, 
modernisation is more clearly a response to the declining availability of campaign workers. 
 
Modern techniques have not replaced traditional ones in British constituency campaigning, as 
predicted in stage 3 of the framework introduced above, but the balance has certainly shifted 
to the extent that what might be described as a modern approach to campaigning is now more 
prevalent. British parties, we suggest therefore, are now somewhere between stages 2 and 3 
in the typology of changes in campaigning.  
 
Resource 
Centralisation 
There is much qualitative evidence indicating that during the 1990s and after constituency 
campaigns in Britain came increasingly to be directed and managed by professionals at 
central party headquarters (Denver et al., 2003; Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a). Similar 
trends have also been observed in Australia and New Zealand (Ward, 2003; Denemark, 
2003).  What has emerged is a new and much stronger relationship between the national and 
local campaigns.  National party professionals now seek to exercise much greater influence 
and control over local campaigning by managing key constituency campaigns in crucial 
respects and integrating them much more closely into the national effort.  Local campaign 
strategies are developed centrally and in tandem with the parties’ overall national campaign 
strategies.  The centre appoints special campaign organisers in key seats (or provides 
centrally-paid agents in the case of the Conservatives) and is involved in local campaigns in a 
variety of other ways – by organising direct mail operations and telephone canvassing from 
outside the constituency; for example. These changes began first, and have gone furthest, in 
the Labour party but both the Conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats 
have followed Labour’s lead. As has been argued elsewhere, in many respects the initiative in 
local campaigning in target seats has passed from the local party to the parties’ national 
headquarters (Denver et al. 1998).  
Fisher, Denver and Hands (2006a) sought to analyse this trend by constructing quantitative 
scales to measure the degree of central involvement in constituency campaigns. The results 
generally confirmed the arguments advanced on the basis of qualitative data – centralisation 
was on the increase, Labour had taken the lead in this respect but the Conservatives were 
catching up. Although central involvement had also increased in the case of the Liberal 
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Democrats, it had not gone as far as in the other parties, partly due to a simple lack of 
resources but also in line with the party’s decentralising ethos. This analysis also found that 
central involvement was heavily targeted - the central involvement index scores were 
significantly higher in target seats than in the other categories.  Not unexpectedly, central co-
ordinating efforts were strongly focused on the campaigns that were most electorally 
significant. 
 
In this section, we update the previous discussions of increasing central involvement in 
constituency campaigns by adding material from the 2005 general election. The parties’ 
strategies in that election certainly suggest a further development of centralising trends, 
especially on the part of the Conservatives and Labour (Fisher et al., 2007). Both sought to 
present their national message within a local context.  To that end, in campaign material 
circulated within a constituency policies were frequently not described in a national context 
but presented as proposals which would have a particular impact in the constituency 
concerned. This was achieved principally though the extensive use of direct communication 
techniques by both Labour and the Conservatives to contact key voters in key seats. Both 
parties had large communication centres from which key voters were sent direct mail and 
contacted by telephone. In effect, national headquarters were playing an ever-greater role in 
communicating the messages of the constituency campaigns. In a particular innovation, many 
voters were telephoned not by an individual in a call centre, but by an automated phone 
system, allowing parties to collect vote intention data (or ‘Voter ID’) and other relevant 
information more quickly and more cheaply than before. Arguably, by 2005 the ‘ground war’ 
in the constituencies had come to be seen as more important than the ‘air war’ waged at 
national level.  Fisher (2005) shows that the ‘national’ campaigns of  all three major parties 
were strongly focused on target seats and that regional media advertising was as important, if 
not more so than that undertaken at national level. This is further confirmation of the 
importance that the parties now attach to local campaigning but, significantly, it is nationally-
co-ordinated constituency campaigning that is dominant rather than locally organised-
campaigning. 
We illustrate these trends, using quantitative measures, in Table 8.  We have two measures of 
centralisation – one covering the whole period 1992-2005 and a second that reflects changes 
in campaign activities (especially the development of telephone canvassing) for which data 
are available only from 1997. Details of the variables used are given in the Appendix. The 
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data shown here refer only to English constituencies since survey responses to questions 
about ‘national’ headquarters are likely to be less reliable and consistent in Scotland and 
Wales. The data show, as expected, that the level of central involvement in constituency party 
campaigns has grown steadily – for both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats there 
has been an election-on-election increase which is statistically significant, (though only using 
the 1997-2005 index in the case of the Liberal Democrats). Labour was well ahead of the 
other parties in the degree of central involvement in 1992 and has more or less continued at 
the same overall level with a slight but significant dip in 2005.  For all parties, central 
involvement is greatest in target seats – usually by some margin - with the difference between 
these and non-targets being especially marked in the case of Labour campaigns. Using either 
index Labour’s scores in target seats are significantly greater than in other seat types in each 
election. This was also broadly true for the Conservatives from 1997 onwards with the odd 
exception (such as the 1992-2005 index in 2005). For the Liberal Democrats, targets and held 
seats had significantly higher scores than those not held or targeted in both 2001 and 2005 
using the 1997-2005 index. 
While central involvement in constituency campaigns has certainly increased, then, this 
development is most marked in target seats.  In hopeless seats, in contrast, central 
involvement, if anything, has declined over the period. Labour is the most ‘centralised’ of the 
parties in that Labour campaigns in their targets consistently have the highest index score as 
well as greatest differentiation between target and non-target seats.  In the other parties, it 
would seem some residual local resistance remains to what is seen as central ‘interference’.  
This may, in part, be explained by differing party ‘cultures’. Conservative constituency 
associations, for example, have traditionally enjoyed significant autonomy, whilst the ethos 
of the Liberal Democrats leans more towards decentralization. Nonetheless, all three parties 
are clearly moving towards increased levels of centralization in constituency campaigning. 
 
In terms of the analytical framework described above, British campaigns have certainly 
reached Stage 2 with respect to central involvement. In target seats, however, there are 
indications of a move to Stage 3.  In 2005 in these seats there was, of course, considerable 
central scrutiny but, as previously indicated, decentralisation involved tailoring publicity 
about policy to the constituency. Despite the presence of centrally-appointed organisers and 
centrally-controlled activities such as direct mail and telephone canvassing, campaigns in 
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these seats also remain relatively strong in terms of ‘foot slogging’ activities on the ground, 
which are inherently decentralised.   
 
[Table 8 About Here] 
 
Staffing 
Overwhelmingly, the work related to constituency campaigning is carried out by volunteers. 
However, the modernisation and centralisation of campaigns have involved an increase in the 
numbers of paid staff with responsibilities related to the local effort – mainly staff at the 
parties’ national headquarters and in national call centres. Indeed, Webb and Fisher (2003:10) 
have noted that there have been substantial increases in the proportion of all kinds of paid 
staff relative to members in both the Conservative and Labour parties. Even ‘on the ground’, 
however, there have also been significant changes with paid staff playing an increasingly 
significant role in some constituency campaigns. 
 
Since the late nineteenth century, election agents have been key figures in constituency 
campaigns.  However, the development of national campaigns during the twentieth century 
and, most critically, cost effective forms of mass communication (especially television) 
meant that the constituency campaign – and hence also the local party agent - declined in 
status and significance.  Nonetheless, the number of full-time agents remained notably large 
until the 1950s (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006c) although only those constituency parties 
that could afford one employed an agent.  Overall, the organisation of staff for constituency 
campaigns was almost entirely localised.   From the 1950s, however, the numbers of full-time 
agents declined steeply.  The trend was very much towards volunteer agents - typically 
people with plenty of knowledge of the local political scene and experience of working in 
election campaigns - appointed by candidates simply to run a campaign.  In terms of 
resources, this period clearly represented what we have called Stage 1 in the development of 
constituency campaigning – voluntary activity plus assistance from the central (and regional) 
party bureaucracy. 
 
During the 1990s, as we have seen, the parties began to re-assess the importance of 
constituency campaigning and as a result central party staff began to take constituency 
campaigning much more seriously. Party managers realised that there was an important job to 
be done in the constituencies but they also increasingly came (or were forced) to the view that 
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employing full-time agents locally or relying entirely on voluntary agents was not necessarily 
the best way to do it – even although the law still requires the appointment of a local agent.   
 
One response from the parties was to try to ‘professionalise’ the volunteers – providing 
programmes of training to develop the organisational skills and abilities that can profitably be 
brought to bear at constituency level. Labour, for example, introduced a professional training 
programme for campaign organisers in 1999, which involved a formal award upon 
completion (Webb and Fisher, 2003: 18). In addition, however, all three parties have looked 
for other ways to ensure that professional expertise is available to key constituency 
campaigns.  For example, since 1997 the Conservatives have employed and part-financed 
local agents from the centre. In addition, following the 1997 election, the party abolished its 
regional tier of organisation and moved to a system in which Area Campaign Directors had 
responsibility for a number of constituencies.  Labour began to appoint special organisers in 
1992 – people centrally recruited, trained and appointed on short-term contracts - to particular 
target constituencies (or groups of constituencies) to oversee election preparations and then to 
organise the campaign itself.  The Liberal Democrats have not had the resources to undertake 
programmes on this scale but, even so, by 2001 party headquarters provided financial 
assistance to allow paid agents or part-time organisers to be employed in key seats and two 
Assistant Campaign Directors were appointed at national level to assist and encourage the 
development of effective constituency campaign organisations (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 
2006c).  
 
In sum, it would seem that in this respect parties have moved to Stage 2 of our framework 
and are displaying some characteristics of Stage 3. Parties have professionalized their staff 
(both paid and volunteer) at both national and local levels (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Fisher, 
Denver and Hands, 2006c).  Moreover, in the case of Labour at least, in target seats having 
professional staff on short-term contracts is now almost the norm and the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats have also started to move towards short-term contract staff.  It remains the 
case, however, that in most constituencies the brunt of the burden of organising and running 
campaigns falls upon local volunteers and full-time staff at party headquarters.  
 
Feedback 
Parties regularly seek feedback from voters in order to monitor their performance.  During 
election campaigns, however, the need for relevant information is heightened and voter 
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reactions are monitored more or less continuously. When parties are at Stage 1 in our 
typology of campaign development the main source of such feedback is traditional doorstep 
canvassing. However, for a variety of reasons, we would expect this to be of diminishing 
importance. Parties have fewer members and other workers to participate in canvassing and 
there is a growing number of alternative forms of gathering feedback from voters, which are 
likely to be more efficient. Telephone canvassing, for example, requires no travelling 
between addresses and usually callers employ a standard script so that a standard set of 
information is collected from each person contacted. Automated calls make the process even 
more efficient. There are debates about whether such methods are desirable or whether voters 
respond well to them (Gerber & Green, 2000, 2001; Pattie & Johnston, 2003) but there is no 
doubt that these methods are on the increase. 
 
Table 9 charts the decline in doorstep canvassing.  It shows the mean percentage of the 
electorate in each constituency that was canvassed on the doorstep in each election since 
1992 across all types of seat.  Notwithstanding a small revival for all parties in 2005,
3
 the 
overall trend is clear (and statistically significant) – over these four elections the proportion 
of the electorate canvassed locally has declined. And, despite the decline, familiar patterns 
emerge. With the exception of 1997, the extent of Labour canvassing in target seats was 
significantly greater than in other seats. The Liberal Democrats canvassed to a significantly 
lesser extent in unwinnable seats than in those targeted and held in 2001 and 2005.  The same 
pattern held for the Conservatives in all four elections.  
 
[Table 9 About Here] 
 
In Table 10, we examine the extent to which more modern feedback methods have been 
employed, such as telephone canvassing and direct mail. The index used here was created in 
the same way as others previously described and details of variables used are in the 
Appendix. Given the emphasis on telephone canvassing, data for this index are available only 
from 1997 onwards.  As expected, modern and perhaps more ‘scientific’ forms of voter 
feedback have come increasingly to the fore. In all parties, there has been a clear and 
statistically significant growth in modern feedback techniques since 1997 – especially in 
                                                 
3  The rise in 2005  is amplified slightly  by the less robust Conservative figure 
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target seats - demonstrating that they have moved from Stage 1 to Stage 2 of the relevant part 
of the development framework, at least.   
 
Qualitative evidence also supports this argument. In 2005, for example, Labour used DVDs 
to target weak and undecided Labour voters. All viewers of the DVD would see an opening 
film based upon their constituency (featuring the MP/candidate and work undertaken in the 
local community). There was then a menu of additional features including four local stories 
about health, the economy, crime and education, and a national message from Tony Blair. 
The DVD also contained a feedback mechanism, which enabled the party to ascertain how 
much of the DVD was viewed and evidently many key voters watched it in its entirety 
(Fisher et al., 2005: 19).  
 
In the same election, the Conservatives increased their use of polling and focus group data. 
Daily tracking polls were undertaken among key voters in target seats, focussing on salient 
issues, candidate recognition and assessments of the party leaders. Focus group research was 
also employed to check on how campaign messages were being received and the party used 
the results to ‘tweak messages’ on particular issues (such as crime and immigration) in an 
attempt to attract undecided voters (Fisher et al., 2005: 20). Moreover, in all parties, the 
central monitoring of local campaigns has increased significantly, so that even individual 
constituency campaigns can be ‘tweaked’ in response to local concerns.  All of this suggests 
that, in terms of feedback, British parties are well on the way to Stage 3 of our typology, if 
not already there. 
 
[Table 10 About Here] 
 
Thematic 
Tours by Party Leaders and Key Party Figures 
Tours by key party figures have long been a highly visible component of constituency party 
campaigning.  Gladstone was the first major politician to ‘stump the country’ in the 
nineteenth century, delivering speeches directed at the whole country (and reported in the 
press) but with a local twist designed to make the speeches more relevant to his audience 
(Hanham, 1978: 202-4). In the 1950 election, Clement Attlee (the Prime minister) undertook 
a 1,000 mile tour around Britain being driven in a pre-war (and far from deluxe) family 
saloon by his wife (Nicholas, 1951: 93-4).  
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Attlee’s tour, during which he reportedly visited seven towns a day, was focussed on 
Labour’s key electoral regions (Nicholas, 1951:90). At the same election, Winston Churchill 
also spoke in a number of constituencies – amongst them, Plymouth Devonport, chosen 
apparently because of the highly newsworthy contest there between Randolph Churchill and 
Michael Foot (Nicholas, 1951: 94).  This mirrors in some ways the 1966 campaign, in which 
Conservative leadership visits to marginals tended to be a function of personal contacts, 
rather than a centrally co-ordinated effort by the party (Butler and King, 1966: 194). Indeed, 
Denver and Hands (1997:111) noted that as late as 1992 personal favours could still explain 
some constituency visits by the party hierarchy.  
 
However, as Butler and Kavanagh (1974: 224) suggest, from 1974 there was a far greater 
emphasis on focussing leadership tours on marginal seats, rather than on regions or 
newsworthy contests. In advance of the February 1974 election, both major parties had drawn 
up short lists of key marginals in advance and during the campaign itself, all parties tried to 
direct their prominent national speakers to these seats (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 224-6). 
That said, some local parties did not entirely support this strategy, claiming that the visits 
were too disruptive – a problem that Denver and Hands (1997: 112) also reported in the 1992 
election. Nonetheless, from February 1974 onwards, it was clear that party leadership tours 
were planned around marginal seats to a far greater degree than previously. Butler and 
Kavanagh (1975: 226) say that, in the October election of the same year, Conservative 
marginal seats were given ‘a special claim on front bench speakers’, and by 1979 the practice 
was well established (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980: 308). Clearly, then, by 1979 party 
leadership tours had moved from stage 1 to stage 2 of the campaigning development 
framework – from nationwide whistle-stop tours to a focus on target seats.  
 
Our surveys of party agents allow us to test the extent to which these practices have evolved 
since 1992 and relevant data are shown in Table 11. No question was asked on this aspect of 
campaigning in 2001, and while it was restored in 2005, the question about leadership visits 
asked only whether they had occurred, rather than about the frequency of visits as in 1992 
and 1997. Nevertheless, the data do provide some indication of change over time.  
 
As anticipated, in all parties senior figures are far more likely to visit target seats than other 
constituencies. In the cases of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the concentration on target 
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seats appears to have become more marked, with declines in visits to seats that were neither 
targeted nor held. The differences between target and non-target seats for Labour are 
particularly marked – especially in 1997 when every target seat among our responding 
constituencies received a visit and the mean number of visits was an astonishing 6.7. In 2005, 
there was something of an increase in visits to safer Labour-held seats. This can probably be 
explained by the fact that Labour was on the defensive not only from its opponents, but also 
from disillusioned Labour supporters. Appearances by party ‘names’ in safe seats were 
probably organised, therefore, to ‘rally the troops’.  
 
The data for the Conservatives are a little more puzzling. It is true that in all three elections 
senior party figures were far more likely to visit target seats and in 1992 and 1997, visited 
almost all of them. The dip in the proportion of target seats visited in 2005 is almost certainly 
a function of the lower response rate from Conservative agents in that year. However, in all 
three elections, it is notable that ‘hopeless’ seats were relatively well treated in terms of 
leadership visits – more so than safe seats. Given that, as already mentioned, an underlying 
problem with Conservative campaigns has been that they tend to mount needlessly strong 
campaigns in their safest seats, this is a particularly peculiar result. It may be a consequence 
of the fact that in 2005 the Conservatives needed to be on the offensive - to make serious 
efforts even in seats that were not among their best prospects – although it may also suggest 
that Labour and the Liberal Democrats are simply better than the Conservatives at targeting 
leadership visits. Whatever the reason, it suggests that the extent to which parties are moving 
between Stage 2 and 3 of the typology varies somewhat – certainly Labour would appear to 
be ahead of the Conservatives in this respect. 
 
[Table 11 About Here] 
 
Targeting of Voters 
One of the consequences of class and partisan dealignment is that parties are no longer able to 
rely on core groups of voters for almost automatic support. Thus, of necessity, parties are 
likely to move on from Stage 1 of our typology although, as evidence from New Zealand 
illustrates, different countries can experience dealignment at completely different times 
(Denemark, 2003: 603). In the British case, dealignment has been progressing for at least 
thirty years so it is little surprise that parties no longer focus their campaigning activities on 
maintaining support among specific social categories. The question is whether in this respect 
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local campaigning is best characterised as being at Stage 2 (mobilizing voters across all 
categories) or Stage 3 (targeting specific groups of voters).  Table 12 provides some 
indication of the extent of group targeting conducted at constituency level. The data derive 
from responses to a question asking how much effort local parties put into targeting specific 
groups. Answers were measured on a five-point scale (a higher score indicating more effort) 
and the table shows mean responses. Some groups are targeted for special attention by all 
parties as a matter of course – first-time voters and postal voters, for example - but there is 
often some differentiation in respect of other groups.  In 2005, for example, the Conservative 
focussed in particular on pensioners; Labour on pensioners and ethnic minorities, and the 
Liberal Democrats on pensioners and students (Fisher et al., 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, the data in Table 12 suggest that there has been little overall change over the 
four elections in the effort made by parties in targeting specific groups, although the Liberal 
Democrats and Conservatives appear to have put in significantly more effort in 2005.  If the 
data are disaggregated by target status then familiar patterns emerge – usually much more 
effort takes place in target seats. This is especially true of Labour until 2005, when there 
appears to have been greater efforts to target specific groups of voters in safe seats. Again, 
this is likely to have been a function of the fact that Labour was on the defensive in this 
election. 
 
[Table 12 About Here] 
 
 
However, the effort undertaken at local level provides only a partial picture of attempts to 
influence specific groups of voters within constituencies. As we have seen, the parties’ 
headquarters have become increasingly important in constituency campaigns and have 
contributed directly via telephone canvassing and direct mail, over and above purely local 
activities. Interviews with party professionals suggest that in terms of these nationally-
directed efforts the parties have certainly moved strongly to targeting specific categories of 
voters. Labour was first to move significantly in this direction in preparation for the 1997 
election. Telephone banks were established some 18 months before the election and party 
workers across the country used them to contact voters in key seats.  Using a centrally-
designed script-cum-questionnaire, callers allocated voters to one of a number of categories 
and this information was then used to identify target groups of voters, comprising about 15 
per cent of the electorate in the relevant constituencies.  Subsequently, these voters were re-
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contacted by telephone, sent appropriate direct mail communications at regular intervals and 
visited in person by local campaign workers (Denver et al., 2003: 543). In the 2001 and 2005 
elections these techniques were further refined. In 2001, the party began to make use of 
demographic data relating to neighbourhoods, combining them with a database of voter 
identification, which enabled not only further refinement of the target groups to be contacted 
from the centre, but also provided the basis for guidelines issued to constituencies detailing 
which groups and areas should receive special attention (Denver et al., 2003: 544). In 2005, 
the process was taken even further, with young people, women and families, and Muslims 
receiving particular attention (Fisher et al., 2005: 13).  
 
The Conservatives have also employed this sort of approach and although they were initially 
not as advanced as Labour, by 2005 they had effectively caught-up and were enthusiastically 
prosecuting a strategy of targeting key groups in target seats – in particular pensioners and 
ethnic minorities (Fisher et al., 2005: 12). The Liberal Democrats, in contrast, have made far 
less use of the kinds of technology employed by Labour and the Conservatives. This was 
principally a function of cost – the party is notably less wealthy than the other two and such 
methods require investment at least two years before an election. Thus, although the Liberal 
Democrats were better funded than ever before for the 2005 campaign, financial support 
arrived too late to be invested in such technology (Fisher, 2005: 184). Nevertheless, there is 
still evidence that by 2005, the party had also reached Stage 3 in terms of targeting voters. At 
that election the party tried in particular to engage and mobilise students by targeting 
university campuses (with the assistance of Liberal Democrat student societies), and by 
targeting mail specifically at students (Fisher et al., 2005:14). 
 
Conclusions 
Studies of district-level campaigning have clearly demonstrated that local efforts can have a 
significant electoral effect and that concentrating on national campaigns – characteristic of 
much of the literature on campaigning – gives an incomplete picture of elections. Typologies 
describing the development of national campaigns are relatively common and are, of course, 
important in their own way.  It also remains the case that national and local strategies are 
closely intertwined but we suggest that a distinct framework applying to district-level 
campaigning is needed to analyse changes in local campaigning in a comparative context – 
even if it is informed by previous work on national campaigning. The use of the framework 
introduced here allows for an examination of many aspects of campaigning that are 
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specifically pertinent to the district level which will often not be captured by national level 
studies. Moreover, the disaggregation of campaign styles shows how levels of income do not 
have uniform effects on parties’ ability to campaign. During the period studied here, for 
example, Labour has typically been the wealthiest party at national level (Fisher, 2005). Yet, 
the Conservatives have still been able to mount strong campaigns. More telling is the case of 
the Liberal Democrats who are markedly less wealthy than either Labour or the 
Conservatives. Yet, that party has been able to mount successful campaigns though strategic 
use of resources. In sum, therefore, the framework introduced here represents an attempt to 
better classify the distinct and important developments that have occurred in district-level 
campaigning.  
 
Applying the framework to the British case shows quite clearly that there are variations in 
campaign development across the different parties and also according to the particular aspect 
of campaigning being considered. Moreover, there is further variation depending upon the 
electoral status of the constituency.  Applying it in other systems should help researchers to 
make systematic cross-national comparisons.  Developments in constituency campaigning in 
Britain are summarized in Table 13 which suggests that, across the various stages of 
development, Labour is the most ‘modern’ in its approach to campaigning, just pipping the 
Conservatives in respect of staffing and the use of leading party figures. The Conservatives, 
in turn, are just ahead of the Liberal Democrats, although the differences are not great. In our 
previous work, reliant on qualitative evidence, we suggested that while Labour had taken the 
lead in developing constituency campaigning, the other major parties were ‘catching-up’ 
(Denver et al., 2003). This suggestion is borne out by the various analyses presented here. It 
might be expected that the Conservatives would catch up – the major parties keep an eye on 
one another’s activities and are happy to copy good ideas – but it is interesting to find that the 
Liberal Democrats too have made significant advances, given their relative lack of resources, 
especially finance. In fact, the summary data in Table 13, together with the details previously 
discussed suggest that all three major British parties have adapted well to the changed 
electoral, organisational and technical circumstances, though it may be the case that Labour’s 
progress has ‘stalled’ a little. Nevertheless, all three have modernised their constituency 
campaigns and doubtless will continue to do so as new circumstances arise and new ideas 
emerge about how to achieve the fundamental task for all parties – getting people to vote for 
them. 
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Yet these trends also have significant implications. In all parties there is a move away from 
traditional grass-roots activism and towards more modern and centrally directed 
campaigning. This is a clear example of a more general move from mass membership-based 
parties to ‘electoral-professional’ parties. There are also wider implications. First, the evident 
targeting strategy of parties is likely to amplify the differential levels of electoral turnout 
between marginal and non-marginal seats. If that occurs, the effect will be likely to be a 
depression in aggregate levels of turnout, together with disenchantment of voters in seats not 
targeted by parties. Of course, the parties cannot be blamed for this – it is an entirely rational 
response to the logic of a first past the post electoral system. Secondly, the targeting strategy 
in combination with greater centralisation and modern campaign methods may put pressure 
on the regulatory framework. In Britain, national and district level campaigning are regarded 
as being separate for regulatory purposes. How far that distinction can remain meaningful, 
however, is a moot point. On a more positive note, however, the strategies employed by 
parties such as voter differentiation, feedback and local focus as demonstrated here may 
actually illustrate a greater willingness on the part of parties to note and act upon voters’ 
concerns. Thus, the stages of development in district-level campaigning should be seen as 
just that, with implications that be both positive and negative. 
 
 
 
[Table 13 About Here] 
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Figure 1: Three Stages in the Development of District-level Election Campaigning 
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
 
Technical  Short-term campaign 
preparations 
 Sporadic use of 
technology. 
Campaigning is 
largely traditional 
and labour intensive 
 Longer-term 
preparations 
including specialist 
campaign committee 
at centre 
 Technology widely 
used alongside 
traditional campaign 
techniques 
 
 Permanent campaign 
with specialist 
campaign department 
at centre 
 Technology replaces 
traditional campaign 
techniques 
 
Resource  Decentralized with 
little standardization 
 Voluntary activity 
and use of traditional 
party bureaucracy 
 Impressionistic 
feedback based 
mainly on canvassing 
 Centralized and 
standardized 
 Voluntary workers 
directed by party 
professionals 
  More scientific 
sources of feedback, 
including opinion 
polls 
 Decentralization of 
operation with 
central scrutiny 
 Professional staff on 
short-term contracts 
 Greater range of 
polling techniques 
making greater use 
of feedback 
Thematic  Whistle-stop tours by 
party leaders 
 Focus on mobilising 
the vote of 
supporters 
 Tours by party 
leaders focussed on 
target seats 
 Mobilizing voters 
across all categories 
 Party leaders 
concerned only with 
target seats 
 District campaigns 
become more 
important than the 
national campaign 
 Targeting of 
individual voters 
 
Source: Derived from Farrell and Webb, (2002: 104) 
 
 
 
Table 1: Long-Term Preparation in British Constituency Campaigns 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 118 - 112  (114) 114  (116) 130  (136) 
Labour 112  - 112  (111) 100  (103) 98  (102) 
Lib  Dems 91  - 84  (83) 78  (78) 82  (84) 
 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are for the index calculated for the period 1997-2005.  For the numbers on which 
this and all subsequent tables are based see the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Long-Term Preparation in British Constituency Campaigns by Seat Status 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative         
Held Not Target 121 - 118 (121) 122 (125) 131 (136) 
Target 121 - 124 (130) 125 (130) 128 (136) 
Not Held Not Target 112 - 102 (103) 99 (100) 130 (135) 
Labour         
Held Not Target 108 - 111 (109) 104 (104) 105 (110) 
Target 124 - 124 (134) 115 (110) 111 (121) 
Not Held Not Target 106 - 108 (106) 88 (89) 83 (83) 
Lib Dems         
Held Not Target * - * * 108 (103) 115  (116) 
Target 110 - 116 (119) 116 (120) 119 (127) 
Not Held Not Target 89 - 81  (81) 74  (73) 73 (74) 
 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are for the index calculated for the period 1997-2005. 
*  Too few cases for analysis. 
 
Table 3.  Mean number of party members per constituency, 1992-2005 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 1,542 732 646 892 
Labour 444 592 475 349 
Liberal Democrats 166 162 130 157 
 
 
Table 4. Trends in Traditional Campaigning  
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
Conservative 131 109 107 127 
Labour 116 115 98 97 
Liberal Democrats 87 83 77 89 
     
All 109 103 93 97 
 
 
Table 5. Trends in Campaign Modernisation  
  
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 99  -- 109  (107) 111  (110) 132  (133) 
Labour 92  -- 109  (103) 112  (107) 112  (109) 
Lib Dems 72 -- 87  (80) 93  (85) 106  (99) 
         
All 85  -- 101  (96) 105  (100) 111 (107) 
 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are for the index  calculated for the period 1997-2005. 
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Table 6.  Net Modernisation Scores (Traditionalism – Modernisation ) 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 32  - 0  (2) -5  (-3) -5  (-6) 
Labour 25  - 6  (12) -14  (-9) -16  (-12) 
Lib Dems 15  - -3  (4) -17  (-9) -17  (-10) 
         
All 24  - 2  (7) -13  (-8) -14  (-10) 
 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are for the index calculated for the period 1997-2005. 
 
Table 7. Net Modernisation Scores (Traditionalism – Modernisation ) by seat status 
 
  
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
Conservative         
Held Not Target 50 - 12 (13) 5 (6) 4 (4) 
Target 12 - -8 (-8) -8 (-11) -12 (-15) 
Not Held Not Target 15 - -7 (-5) -10 (-6) -38 (-36) 
Labour         
Held Not Target 32 - 10 (18) -12 (-5) -14 (-11) 
Target 24 - 3 (1) -15 (-16) -18 (-20) 
Not Held Not Target 21 - 3 (11) -15 (-8) -16 (-10) 
Lib Dems         
Held Not Target * - * * -4 (1) -7 (-5) 
Target 40 - 20 (24) -9 (-6) -3 (-5) 
Not Held Not Target 13 - -5 (2) -18 (-9) -16 (-10) 
 
Note:  Figures in parenthesis are for the index calculated for the period 1997-2005.  
*  Too few cases for analysis. 
 
Table 8: Central Involvement in Constituency Campaigning  
     
 1992 
 
1997 2001 2005 
Conservative 100 - 102 (100) 112 (110) 121 (122) 
Held Not Target 98 - 95 (92) 107 (104) 120 (117) 
Target 112 - 127 (125) 127 (129) 129 (137) 
Not Held Not Target 98 - 101 (98) 103 (101) 95 (92) 
         
Labour 108 - 107 (106) 107 (108) 101 (102) 
Held Not Target 102 - 99 (95) 102 (100) 97 (97) 
Target 121 - 150 (159) 130 (138) 134 (145) 
Not Held Not Target 103 - 100 (97) 100 (98) 92 (91) 
         
Lib Dems 86 - 86 (86) 91 (89) 92 (92) 
Held Not Target * - * * 111 (106) 108 (112) 
Target 92 - 130 (128) 116 (117) 112 (116) 
Not Held Not Target 85 - 84 (83) 89 (87) 88 (87) 
 
Note 1: Figures in parenthesis are for the index calculated for the period 1997-2005. 
Note 2: Figures calculated for English seats only.   
*  Too few cases for analysis. 
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Table 9.  Mean Percentage of Electorate Canvassed On the Doorstep 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target  
 
42 
 
50 
48 
25 
 
27 
 
37 
30 
19 
 
27 
 
36 
35 
19 
 
37 
 
41 
38 
8 
 
Labour 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
34 
 
37 
53 
21 
 
26 
 
26 
29 
26 
 
18 
 
17 
29 
13 
 
20 
 
23 
33 
10 
 
Lib Dems 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
12 
 
* 
29 
11 
 
12 
 
* 
33 
10 
 
8 
 
19 
19 
7 
 
11 
 
21 
21 
8 
 
*   Too few cases for analysis 
 
Table 10.  Index of Modern Feedback Use in Constituency Campaigns 
 
 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target  
 
109 
 
112 
133 
98 
 
108 
 
111 
133 
88 
 
128 
 
116 
146 
137 
 
Labour 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
105 
 
95 
160 
95 
 
109 
 
104 
151 
90 
 
113 
 
118 
153 
89 
 
Lib Dems 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
80 
 
* 
111 
77 
 
79 
 
88 
121 
76 
 
92 
 
114 
137 
82 
 
*   Too few cases for analysis 
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Table 11: Visits to Constituencies by Senior Party Figures 
 1992 1997  2005 
Conservative 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
52% 
98% 
60% 
 
 (1.1) 
 (4.7) 
 (1.7) 
 
45% 
98% 
69% 
 
 (1.0) 
 (4.5) 
 (1.8) 
  
3% 
57% 
33% 
Labour 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
28% 
87% 
24% 
 
 (0.7) 
 (3.8) 
 (0.6) 
 
22% 
100% 
31% 
 
 (0.5) 
 (6.7) 
 (0.7) 
  
37% 
96% 
18% 
Lib Dem 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
* 
73% 
22% 
 
 * 
 (2.0) 
 (0.4) 
 
* 
90% 
19% 
 
 * 
 (2.9) 
 (0.3) 
  
30% 
88% 
21% 
 
Note: The percentages show the proportion of constituencies which received a leadership visit.  For 1992 and 
1997, figures in parenthesis represent the mean number of visits by party leadership figures 
 
*  Too few cases for analysis 
 
 
Table 12. Mean Effort in Targeting Specific Groups 
 
 1992 1997 2001 2005 
 
Conservative 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target  
 
2.8 
 
2.5 
3.4 
2.8 
 
2.6 
 
2.7 
3.3 
2.3 
 
2.6 
 
2.5 
3.1 
2.3 
 
3.0 
 
3.7 
2.7 
2.2 
 
Labour 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
3.0 
 
3.0 
3.7 
2.6 
 
2.9 
 
3.0 
4.2 
2.5 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
3.7 
2.3 
 
2.8 
 
3.6 
3.1 
2.0 
 
Lib Dems 
 
Held Not Target 
Target 
Not Held Not Target 
 
2.1 
 
* 
3.0 
2.0 
 
2.1 
 
* 
3.9 
2.0 
 
2.0 
 
3.0 
3.7 
1.8 
 
2.4 
 
3.6 
4.0 
2.0 
 
*  Too few cases for analysis 
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Table 13.  Summarizing Stages of Development in British Constituency Campaigning 
 
  Stage Reached 
 
  Conservative Labour Liberal  
Democrats 
 
Technical Preparation 2 2 2 
 Use of Technology 2/3 2/3 2/3 
     
Resource Centralisation 2 2 2 
 Staffing 2/3 3/2 2/3 
 Feedback 3/2 3/2 2 
     
Thematic Party Leaders 2/3 3/2 2/3 
 Voter Targeting 3 3 3 
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Appendix 
 
The numbers of cases involved in Tables 1-12 are as follows: 
 
  1992 1997 2001 2005 
Conservative 
   Held non-target 136 166 122 39 
 Target  45 64 103 23 
 Not held not target 84 204 150 6 
 Total  265 434 375 68 
Labour 
   Held non-target 98 168 183 162  
 Target  94 65 96 51 
 Not held not target 163 222 164 121 
 Total  355 455 443 334 
Liberal Democrat 
   Held non-target - 1 10 23 
 Target  33 29 33 24 
 Not held not target 350 381 389 165 
 Total  383 411 432 212 
 
 
 
Variables Used to Create the Index of Long-Term Campaigning  
 Length of time the agent had been appointed  (Just before the campaign, Within the last 6 months, Within 
the last year, More that a year ago) 
 When the party started planning for the campaign (Just before the campaign, Within the last 6 months, 
Within the last year, More that a year ago) 
 How prepared the party was in appointing people to do specific campaign jobs (5 point scale: 1 = Not 
Started, 5 = Fully Prepared) 
 How prepared the party was in raising campaign funds (5 point scale: 1 = Not Started, 5 = Fully Prepared) 
 How prepared the party was in deciding the location of the main committee room (5 point scale: 1 = Not 
Started, 5 = Fully Prepared) 
 How prepared the party was in obtaining a copy of the electoral register (5 point scale: 1 = Not Started, 5 = 
Fully Prepared) 
 How prepared the party was in preparing the content of the candidate’s election address (5 point scale: 1 = 
Not Started, 5 = Fully Prepared) 
 How prepared the party was in making arrangements for printing campaign material (5 point scale: 1 = Not 
Started, 5 = Fully Prepared) 
 *How prepared the party was in identifying potential supporters through canvassing  (5 point scale: 1 = Not 
Started, 5 = Fully Prepared) 
 *Telephone canvassing from within the constituency by telephone in the year before the election (No, A 
little, A substantial amount) 
 *Use of long-term canvass records (5 point scale: 1 = Not at All, 5 = To a great extent) 
 
* = Variable not available in 1992.  
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Variables Used to Create Index of Traditionalism  
 
 No. of posters distributed per elector (n) 
 No. of leaflets delivered per elector (n) 
 % of electorate canvassed on the doorstep (%) 
 No. of public meetings (n) 
 Mean nos. of campaign and polling day workers (n) 
 Level of ‘manual’ activity on polling day (including delivery of last-minute leaflets (Yes/No), ‘knocking-
up’ (Yes/No), proportion of the electorate covered by number-takers (%)) 
 
 
Variables Used to Create Index of Modernisation 
 
 *Use of computers (Yes/No)  
 *Use of computerised electoral register (Yes/No) 
 *Used party software (Yes/No) 
 *Approximate use of telephone canvassing (%) 
 *Used computers for ‘knocking-up’ (Yes/No) 
 **Used telephones for ‘knocking-up’ (Yes/No) 
 **Use of direct mail (%) 
 **% electorate canvassed by telephone (%) 
 
*  These variables are available for all four elections and were used to create modernisation index A. 
**  These variables are available for elections from 1997 and are used, together with the other variables, 
except the approximate use of telephone canvassing, to create modernisation index B. 
 
Variables Used to Create Index of Centralisation 
 
 *Amount of National contact before campaign (Hardly Ever, Occasionally, Once a Month, Once a Week) 
 *Amount of Regional contact before campaign (Hardly Ever, Occasionally, Once a Month, Once a Week) 
 *Amount of National contact during campaign (Hardly Ever, Once a Week, Every Day) 
 *Amount of Regional contact during campaign (Hardly Ever, Once a Week, Every Day) 
 *Whether used election software supplied by party headquarters (Yes/No) 
 *Whether special organiser appointed from centre (Yes/No) 
 **Length of time special organiser appointed before election (Just Before the Election, Within the Last 6 
Months, Within the Last Year, Over a Year Ago) 
 **Whether there was telephone canvassing from outside constituency  (Yes/No) 
 
*  These variables are available for all four elections and were used to create the centralisation index for 
1992-2005. 
**  These variables are available for elections from 1997 and are used, together with the other variables, to 
create the centralisation index for 1997-2005 
 
 
Variables Used to Create the Index of Feedback 
 
 Pre-Election Telephone Canvassing within constituency  (No, A little, A substantial amount) 
 Direct Mail used to target individual voters (No, A little, A substantial amount) 
 Used Telephone canvassing (No, A little, A substantial amount) 
 Telephone canvassing organised from outside the constituency (Yes/No) 
 Use of previous canvass records (5 point scale: 1 = Not at All, 5 = To a great extent) 
 Campaign effort – telephone canvassing (5 point scale: 1 = Very Little or No Effort, 5 = Very Substantial 
Effort) 
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